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Speech-driven querying is becoming popular in new device environments such as smartphones, tablets, and even conversational assistants. However, such querying is largely restricted to natural language. Typed SQL remains the gold standard for sophisticated structured querying although it is painful in many environments, which restricts when and how users consume their data. In this work, we propose to bridge this gap by designing a speech-driven querying system and interface for structured data we call SpeakQL. We support a practically useful subset of regular SQL and allow users to query in any domain with novel touch/speech based human-in-the-loop correction mechanisms. Automatic speech recognition (ASR) introduces myriad forms of errors in transcriptions, presenting us with a technical challenge. We exploit our observations of SQL's properties, its grammar, and the queried database to build a modular architecture. We present the first dataset of spoken SQL queries and a generic approach to generate them for any arbitrary schema. Our experiments show that SpeakQL can automatically correct a large fraction of errors in ASR transcriptions. User studies show that SpeakQL can help users specify SQL queries significantly faster with a speedup of average 2.7x and up to 6.7x compared to typing on a tablet device. SpeakQL also reduces the user effort in specifying queries by a factor of average 10x and up to 60x compared to raw typing effort. 

Security is a discipline that places significant expectations on lay users. Thus, there are a wide array of technologies and behaviors that we exhort end users to adopt and thereby reduce their security risk. However, the adoption of these "best practices" -- ranging from the use of antivirus products to actively keeping software updated -- is not well understood, nor is their practical impact on security risk well-established. This paper explores both of these issues via a largescale empirical measurement study covering approximately 15,000 computers over six months. We use passive monitoring to infer and characterize the prevalence of various security practices in situ as well as a range of other potentially security-relevant behaviors. We then explore the extent to which differences in key security behaviors impact real-world outcomes (i.e., that a device shows clear evidence of having been compromised). 

In this demonstration, we present SpeakQL, a speech-driven query system and interface for structured data. SpeakQL supports a tractable and practically useful subset of regular SQL, allowing users to query in any domain with unbounded vocabulary with the help of speech/touch based user-in-the-loop mechanisms for correction. When querying in such domains, automatic speech recognition introduces countless forms of errors in transcriptions, presenting us with a technical challenge. We characterize such errors and leverage our observations along with SQL's unambiguous context-free grammar to first correct the query structure. We then exploit phonetic representation of the queried database to identify the correct Literals, hence delivering the corrected transcribed query. In this demo, we show that SpeakQL helps users reduce time and effort in specifying SQL queries significantly. In addition, we show that SpeakQL, unlike Natural Language Interfaces and conversational assistants, allows users to query over any arbitrary database schema. We allow the audience to explore SpeakQL using an easy-to-use web-based interface to compose SQL queries.